Let me try to throw a philosophical spotlight on the topics of value change and new ethics in modern society by pursuing the question: in what sense and why is it symptomatic of the situation of the sciences and higher education, that both express the need today for a new ethic, i.e. an ethic of unlimited responsibility for the planet and for the future on the one hand, but deny or doubt the rational foundation of such an ethic?
ethics, as estabhshed in accordance with Hume, Crusius, and particularly Kant (as compared to the tradition of the Aristotelian natural ethics). On the contrary he doesn't take the possibility of practical reason and thus the possibihty of a rational foundation of ethics into consideration. In doing so he tacitly reduces reason to an ethically neutral, theoretical and technological rationahty. This rationahty can only serve all sorts of intents and purposes without being capable of judging these intents and purposes rationally. In a certain sense Immanuel Kant's concept of practical reason was directed against this inability. In contrast to Max Weber it was expressly criticized in Max Horkheimer's Critique of Instrumental Reason, continued for example by Joseph Weizenbaum's critique of the amoral spirit of calculation of computer science and presently substantiated by the transcendental, pragmatic; program of a rehabilitation of practical reason by reflection on argumentation (Karl-Otto Apel, see above).
With this last remark I have outlined the critical ethics of practical: reason, which, as the ethics of discourse, attempts to give an undogmatic and rational response to the moral and political predicament of our high-tech civilization ("geistige Situation unserer Zeit" as coined by Karl Jaspers):
-a critical answer to the philosophy of our scientific civilization: intersubjectively valid but "value-free' or rather ethically neutral rationality or arational ethics and (solely) subjectively binding determination of values, tertium non datur; -a normative and indirectly ethically oriented answer to the crisis of modem civilization, which is at the same time a crisis of reason, a crisis of life and a crisis of freedom.
1.2
Changes in values and norms against the background of the Zeitgeist (the moral and political predicament of our high-tech civilization).
I would hke to offer the following terse answer to the question posed at the beginning:
The peace movement, ecological movement, civil rights movement -in short, an ethics-oriented crisis of consciousness is growing ever more rapidly in the sciences and higher education and even more strongly to be sure in the public eye. There's a growing awareness of the fact that the non-morally oriented, or rather sheer abandoned use of scientific, technological rationality or unlimited implementation of the means-ends rationality serving political¬ -economic systems ("free market system of the West" and "actually existing sociahsm in the camp of progress and peace") has brought mankind to the brink of planetary catastrophes. I interpret this situation and the growing awareness of this situation philosophically speaking as the outer challenge of the present crisis of our civilization to reason for one to become practical in an ethical as well as a political sense.
This chaUenge is being articulated in public movements, which we can elaborate on with the means of an "understanding sociology" under the heading of "changes in values". A world-wide protest against the morally blind rule of instrumental reason and for a "return to life" (motto of the German Evangelical Church Conference, Hannover 1983) has been afoot since Hiroshima and the resulting moral engagement on the part of Einstein and Oppenheimer via Albert Schweitzer up to the Easter March and peace movements as well as "the ethic concerning the reverence for life" put forth by Albert Schweitzer and initiated by the appeals of the "Club of Rome", the analyses of the "Report for the President -Global 2000" and since the experiences of ecological catastrophes such as Seveso, Harrisburg, oil spills, e.g. off the coast of Brittany and in the Persian Gulf.
The observed change of values is removing itself from a belief in scientific and technological progress, by which the modern civilization in east and west, but also in the south, has been governed. It is going in the direction of an orientation towards universalistic principles of responsibility for life. So much for the description of the situational experience and of the resulting change in values, which is simultaneously a change of norms, because it not only offers an answer to the question of values "What do we really want?", but also to the normative question "What should we do or rather want?" Philosophically speaking, we can reconstruct the dilemma that has determined the answer to this challenge. This dilemma has arisen because the alternative outlined above, "subjective ethics or intersubjective instrumental reason", has yet to be overcome.
2. 1
On the one hand this protest, partially general, partially within the scientific community, supposes or formulates the understanding that an intersubjectively binding ethic of a responsibility for mankind and the environment has become the condition for survival of man and external nature. This assumption is based on the understanding that the incongruity between homo faber, who can accomplish more instrumentally or technologically speaking than he can comprehend or most importantantly answer for, and homo sapiens, -thirdly that human life can even be annihilated in the planetary aftermath of technological activity, be it through the military use of the weapons of mass destruction, be it through the use of civil technologies which can cause ecological catastrophes. The apocalypse is technically feasible and so poses a real threat.
Thus on the one hand there are many important reasons for an intersubjectively binding ethic of a practicahy unlimited responsibility for mankind and for the future.
1.2.2
On the other hand a scientistic consciousness is still predomidant in the sciences and in higher education, so that the foundation of intersubjectivel)^ binding ethics seems altogether impossible, because the equation "reason = = logic" has been in force since Francis Bacon. To put it more accurately: the absolutization of the cognitive form of the sciences as a paradigm for rationahty has resulted in: -a rational foundation being equated with a formal logical deduction of sentences from sentences in an axiomatized, syntactico-semantic sentence system (theory); and -the intersubjective validity of arguments being equated with objectivity along the lines of a "value-free" statement (description and causal explanation) of facts or rather a formal logical conclusion.
I look upon this reverse development of reason "from judgement to calculation" (J. Weizenbaum) as the internal challenge to reason for one to reinstate or rather estabhsh oneself as an authority of practical judgement. The assumption of this challenge is, as I see it, the first and foremost task of science and higher education on the way to the year 2000. The scepticism concerning the foundation of cultural relativism or historicism and decisionism does not disprove this possibihty. It cannot appear in the form of a meaningful or rather veracious argumentation, as it confuses de facto genesis with logical validity, context of discovery with context of justification, when it is formulated as a principle ("everything is relative"), it fails as-an assertive act, as it doesn't represent a meaningful move in the argumentation of the language game. For in the proposition (p) "everything is relative" it contradicts its own claim to validity of the corresponding performative act 'T assert that p is vahd" (and thus not "relative" but "true").
2.
Intersubjectively binding intrinsic (or directly oriented) ethics are logically speaking impossible and are dogmatic in their potential effects. 
2.1.

Intrinsic or material ethics (e.g. teleological ethic in terms of
2.2.
The latter also applies to ecological nature of ethics which proceeds from the assumption that every living being wants to live or rather strives for survival, either in the sense of an enhghtened utihtarianism of (survival) life or in the sense of a religious relationship with nature ("reverence for life"). But the norm which would require that we are committed to supporting this struggle cannot be derived from this. In the face of the ecological crisis and the world nutrition crisis (that is essentially only a crisis in the system to date of the exploitation and distribution of natural resources) one could just as well come to the conclusion: "Save your own skin if you can".
2.3.
In addition to this an ethic of "the principle of hfe" is definitely compatible with a limitation or even a suspension of a practical condition for argumentation: free communication can be dispensed with in favor of an authoritarian system to assure survival and fair distribution (along the lines of the "life principle").
3.
PRACTICAL REASON AS A UNIVERSALISTIC ETHIC OF DISCOURSE AND COMMUNICATION
3.1.
The reflective foundation and the apphcation of an indirectly oriented ethic of communication which reconstructs the constitutive rules of the language game of arguing is practically speaking necessary, logically speaking possible and undogmatic in its consequences.
3.2.
To this end this ethic reconstructs the normative foundation of the sciences as disciphnes of theoretical argumentation but also of modern constitutions or charters as the embodiments of practical argumentation.
3.3.
This cannot be achieved from a theoretical perspective. Theoretical statements are principally fallible. This ethic inquires about the conditions for the possibihty and validity of argumentation as communication from a philosophical, reflective perspective.
3.4.
As form of argumentation science and reasoning are altogether internahzed modes of communication. Thus they are not only based on the rules of logic and linguistic or syntactical structures, but also on rules of the variety of social norms, which assert rights and duties in the form of reciprocity. The autonomy and cooperation rule. Whoever argues that by doing so he has imphcitly recognized the rules of this game, above ah the first rule of all games which requires: "When playing you are to adhere only to the rules of the game being played and not say other rules, extraneous to that game, and accordingly play fair". When carried over into the language game of argumentation this means: "When arguing you are only to offer pertinent arguments, not points extraneous to the argument, and you are to cooperate accordingly with the others arguing as with those having equal rights".
3.7.
The duty to approximate the best argument and the best possible bod> for argumentation (in accordance with the regulative principle of consensus in an unlimited body for communication and argumentation):
The claim contained in the assertive act for vahdity of an argument involves the willingness to strive in each case for the argument and consensus that would stand up under ideal conditions. This effort is at the same time a self-critical effort on the behalf of one's own argument and a socio--critical effort to obtain the best possible public for discussion. This community does not only have to include scientists or rather experts, but basically all those who would possibly wish to participate in the discourse on the meaning of needs (who can voice them as existential rights). For the meaning of needs can only be ascertained in a communicative manner. And needs are elements of situations in the world which are presently being scientifically investigated.
3.7.1. The duty mentioned above thus includes the duty to strive for the conditions for discourse which increasingly approximate the best possible world pubhc for discussion. This duty is vahd as a moral principle as it is not obligated to take, say, only the demands made in each case by those participating in the discourse seriously, but also to ascertain and to voice the possible demands of those who are affected by the results of scientific discourses and by the impact of plans initated by them. All future generations, however, belong today to those possibly affected.
3.7.2.
In this respect the afore-mentioned obhgation contains the following moral criteria: "If those living now or to come who are affected learned about a planned measure M and its consequences, would they be able to present good arguments against it?" 3.7.3.
What can be reasoned (not deduced) by transcendentally pragmatic reflection on argumentation proposed here are only metanorms for discourse. They have the status of criteria for intersubjective validity.
ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST AND COMMUNICATIVE DISCOURSE ETHICS
4.1.
The moral criterion mentioned in 3.7.2. is of the nature of a regulative criterion for validity. But whoever insists with regard to practical pohtics that it is "purely a regulative" priciple has not grasped the qualitatively new situation of mankind: in the face of a planetary destructive potential of our civil and military technologies the existence of all mankind is threatened -so that survival interests are becoming or have become universal for the first time; -so that for the first time the interests of self-preservation can no longer be realized exclusively particularistically or strategically speaking, i.e. as self-assertion at the expense of others, but must be realized at the same time morally speaking, thus in regard to communicative reciprocity and in accordance with the criterion of interests capable of being universalized.
To the extent that enlightened self-interest recognizes that securing peace and human needs as well as preserving the ecosphere is possible by means of world-wide cooperation in the domains of security, distribution of resources and the environment, it converges with morality. And this enlightened self¬ -interest is beginning to understand that in the new situation of mankind regulative moral criteria like the criterion formulated above are also important for the -nevertheless still possible -survival of the human race beyond the year 2000.
